Repositioning Africa at the Crossroads of a New World Order

Written by Karim Anjarwalla
(Editor & Assistant Writer: Rutendo Nyaku)

First published on 30 January 2025 – on Medium

The tectonic plates of global power are shifting — AI, Big Tech, and the economic rebalancing away from the West are redrawing the world’s map, and Africa stands at a crossroads: will it finally turn its immense, untapped potential into transformative action, or remain a continent of unrealised promise?

(reading time: 22 minutes)

We are in a time upheaval arising from long-term shifts in the global balance of power. African countries — save for a few major economies — are rule takers and not rule makers or even rule shapers, making Africa vulnerable to the shifting sands of this multi-polar world.

I will begin by setting the scene on how we arrived in the current global order; the implications of the trends and challenges we are currently witnessing– particularly how it has given rise to what I call “Pied Piper” politics and the flourishing of illiberal democracy. I will then discuss how Africa fits, is impacted by, and is implicated in these shifts. Finally, I will share some of my own observations of how Africa can turn the current global topsy-turvy into its curtain call and thereby reposition its place in the global economy.

I write this essay to argue that Sub-Saharan Africa needs to re-position itself in the global economy by exploiting the limitations and challenges arising in the developed world including labour shortages, ageing populations; rapid digital transformation; and the opportunities presented by the complexities exacerbated by events such as Brexit, as well as the significant geo-political tensions and the attendant economic competition for resources and infrastructure in many parts of Africa.

In the Beginning: Bidding Farewell to a World Order

Until recently, the world in which we lived — in geo-political and economic terms — has been shaped by three key events. The first event can be given a precise date — November 9th, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. In its wake came the collapse of the USSR and the defeat of communism as an economic alternate to capitalism and liberal democracy, the reunification of Germany and hence the resurgence of what is now the European Community and the economic revival of much of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, in some places under a liberal democratic framework and in others in varying shades of authoritarian governments. The second major event had its roots in the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in China in December 1978 during the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) but whose effects began to be felt globally around the same time as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and which culminated in China being admitted into the WTO in 2001. The third event, also happened in Asia, under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and then Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. India began the shift from a heavily state dominated and closed economy to a market-oriented economy and brought to the end the days of the “Licence Raj”.

So, around the same time that the USSR collapsed, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, China and India began a process of accelerated economic resurgence.

From the end of the Second World War, the US and the USSR had been locked in an ideological and military conflict. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction had kept the world free from nuclear conflict, but proxy wars and regime change were how the two super-powers locked horns. Finally, in 1989, the US could claim victory through the liberal economic order that it touted and espoused whilst the USSR collapsed like a house of cards.

It is unsurprising that a time like this could lead to both triumphalism and hubris. Francis Fukayama in his seminal 1992 work “The End of History and the Last Man” encapsulated this zeitgeist arguing that liberal democracy represents the culmination of humanity’s ideological evolution and the “end point of mankind’s ideological development”. Criticisms of Fukayama focus on the first part of the title rather than examining his warnings about the “Last Man” to which I will return. Yet, in many respects, Fukuyama’s central thesis was disproven in real time, not merely through the lens of hindsight. If liberal democracy as conceived by Fukayama was the “end point of mankind’s ideological development” how was it that so much of the world’s economic growth and the consequent improvement in the dignity of the human conditions of millions was being generated outside liberal democracies: in China and the Middle East for example?

Beyond the end of history: economic shifts 1990–2023

Figure 1 below demonstrates how economic power has shifted between 1990 and 2023. These changes are remarkable. China’s rise is of a scope, scale and speed unprecedented in human history. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have demonstrated an ability to diversify out of oil and to produce real growth from a broader economic base. Although India significantly trails China, its economic trajectory seems to be on a consistent upward path. At the same time, its liberal democratic credentials under the BJP are at best mixed. Beyond China, India and the GCC, the Tiger economies of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and even Vietnam have shown remarkable and consistent multi-decade growth, transforming back-water economies into economic champions and in the process materially eliminating poverty.

What this graph unmistakably highlights are the shifting axis of economic power from the West to Asia. It serves as a reminder of the divergent growth patterns between mature economies, which remain stable but lack the dynamism of their emerging counterparts, and the extraordinary potential of developing markets. It underscores the centrality of strategic policymaking, resource management, and economic resilience in navigating this evolving landscape.

For countries like the UK and Brazil, the challenge lies in reinvigorating growth and adapting to the realities of a multipolar economic world. For emerging giants like China and India, the task is to consolidate their gains while addressing the complexities that come with newfound influence. The GCC and Tiger Economies demonstrate that diversification and long-term vision are critical to sustainable growth.

Anaemic growth: Sub-Saharan Africa

And what of Sub-Saharan Africa? Here the overall story is of anaemic growth. For all the talk of “second liberations” and demographic dividends, after decades of more open and apparently more democratic governance, Africa has barely moved in terms of the global share of GDP (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). There are of course countries that have out-performed others. But the overall picture is one of stagnation — as Figures 2 and 3 attest.

Notes: The blue line represents the annual GDP growth rate (%) and the bar chart shows the annual change, with green indicating positive change whilst red indicates negative change.

Much of Africa has barely dented poverty levels and whilst the middle-class has materially grown in some countries such as Kenya, Botswana and Ghana, these economies remain at best lower-middle income countries. Remaining in the lower-middle-income bracket poses profound challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa’s development, signaling stagnation in economic growth and a missed opportunity to transition into higher-value activities. These countries risk being trapped in low-productivity sectors, vulnerable to external shocks, and excluded from global value chains.

Africa stands at a defining moment in its development journey, with immense potential to reshape its role in the global economy. But potential alone is no longer enough. A youthful and rapidly growing population offers the promise of a demographic dividend yet it — and the continent at large — suffer under the weight of high poverty rates, sluggish economic growth, and governance deficits. By 2043, under current trajectories, the number of people living in extreme poverty is set to rise — a stark reminder that time is slipping away to act decisively. Without significant investments in education, infrastructure, and governance reforms, the potential for a transformative demographic dividend remains unrealized. Worse still, these nations risk geopolitical marginalization, with limited influence in global affairs and continued reliance on foreign aid, which in any case is declining practically across all aid providers.

Of Globalisation and the legacy it engendered

The last three decades have also been the zenith of globalisation: of trade and movement of people but also of ideas. Its legacy has been one of a world more healthy, peaceful and prosperous when compared to any time in human history and a world in which goods, services, capital and people have moved across borders more easily than during any other time.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, China’s rise and WTO entry in 2001, and India’s ascent were pivotal economic and geopolitical events, yet the internet’s transformative impact has reshaped the world in ways we are only now beginning to fully grasp — for better or worse.

The Internet was hailed as the great unifier and the great equaliser. A unifier because through the global connectivity it provided, through the common protocols that have been adopted (search engines and operating systems for example) and through the shared “language” that we all use — Uber and its copycats, Google Maps and its copycats and the list is endless — the world seemed more joined up and familiar than ever before. An equaliser because with these common protocols and shared “language” it was believed that the common barriers to personal growth — discrimination in all its forms — would be dissolved in the inevitable rise of meritocracy.

In all this change and growth, however, something lurked beneath the surface, and Joseph Stiglitz and Fukayama warned us about this. The rise of the manufacturing capability of China and India and other countries in the global South resulted in the off shoring of jobs that sustained much of the middle class in Europe and North America.

American consumers spent and spent and spent on Chinese goods, with the Chinese lending to the Americans to allow them to continue their spending spree, much like a drug dealer dishes out supply to addicts, keeping them hooked but alive, so they can keep buying. In the process, however, so called “middle America” was hollowed-out. With all the growth driven by the financial markets, no one really paid attention. Then 2008 happened and the financial engineering that Alan Greenspan and his generation of Central bankers became famous for were exposed for the weapons of financial destruction that they had unleashed.

One can draw a direct line between the de-regulation of the Reagan era, the monetary policies of the Greenspan Fed, the Bush/Cheney wars that cost the US trillions of dollars with little or no return on investment and the double speak of the Obama years and the rise of Donald Trump (Round 1). Trump tuned into legitimate resentments that, until then, were ignored beneath the clamour of Wall Street’s and Silicon Valley’s self-congratulatory and delusional zealotry that financial engineering and big tech would usher in a world of universal prosperity and would be the panacea to all societal ailments. Brexit too was a warning shot to the liberal elite that all was not well with the economic and political orthodoxy of the time.

A rise in illiberal democracy: a time of Pied Piper Politics

Returning to my earlier point on the “Last Man” thesis. Fukuyama cautioned against the complacency that could result from the “triumph” of liberal democracy. In the wake of this complacency, combined with impacts of globalisation, illiberal democrats everywhere have felt empowered — whether in Hungary or Poland, India or Brazil and now in France, Germany and Italy, liberal democracy seems on the retreat. But nowhere was this as unexpected as the United States of America. Whilst electing Trump once could be written off as an electoral misstep, his re-election is a clear rejection by the American electorate of status quo politics. It would be a mistake to assume, as those on the left tend to do, that this is a “right wing twitch” and the moment will simply pass. Instead, there is a longer- term re-ordering underway in politics in much of the West which will have profound consequences, including for those in Africa.

Onwards into the fledgling global order: Pied Piper Politics & De-Globalisation

Even before his election, President Trump effectively made similar territorial claims on foreign nations — Canada, and more notably Greenland and Panama — as President Putin has in relation to Ukraine. In the case of Greenland, he has questioned the legitimacy of Denmark’s sovereignty and claimed that US national security requirements are why Greenland should be part of the US. Do these claims sound familiar to those made by President Putin?

And so, this is how we ended up with Pied Piper Politics. At times of intense complexity and change, people search for simplicity. Across the world, politicians who can offer simple and clear remedies to societies maladies and who can tap into the insecurities and prejudices of a discombobulated electorate, shine like a beacon of light. Why work through the difficult problems of technology-induced unemployment, of immigration, of ageing populations, of Governmental atrophy when you can apparently threaten and bluster your way through economic decline?

From a geo-political perspective these politics will appear more transactional, more narrowly nationalistic and will copy from the George Bush post-September 2001 doctrine of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.

It is in this geo-political context that the economic impacts of AI, machine learning, and robotics are become apparent. The speed and scale of this transformation are often misunderstood — overestimated in the short term but grossly underestimated in the medium term — as wave upon wave of reinforcing technologies and innovations emerge. Consider, for example, the astonishing speed with which COVID-19 vaccines were brought to market — a feat that would have been unthinkable without the power of AI and advanced data processing, enabling medical research at previously unachievable speeds.

As Mustafa Suleyman vividly illustrates in “The Coming Wave”, this is just the beginning. AI-driven tools are revolutionizing healthcare, not just through faster diagnoses but by tailoring treatments to the individual, promising a world of truly personalized medicine. In the field of synthetic biology, AI is unlocking possibilities that were once confined to science fiction — designing new materials, re-engineering biological systems, and solving complex challenges that defied our understanding. And then there’s quantum computing, a force multiplier that, when combined with AI, is poised to tackle problems so complex they have long been deemed unsolvable.

These examples are not isolated achievements; they are harbingers of a future where the convergence of AI and other technologies will reshape entire sectors and redefine what is possible.

However, there are three key dangers to which there does not seem to be an immediate solution and indeed the prospect of the further entrenchment of malign trends.

The first is the inevitable loss of jobs. Daniel Susskind has argued convincingly in “A World Without Work” that it is not obvious that labour atrophy driven by AI, removing human beings from the centre of work for the first time in human history, will eventually result in new work. The talk of Universal Basic Income always appeared unrealistic but in an increasingly fragmented global order such a proposal is simply utopian. In any case, it is not something that any African country could afford. There is a real risk that unemployment levels in Africa, which are already high will increase significantly as a result of the impacts of AI.

The second is in relation to the ownership, control and manipulation of data. Elon Musk’s ascendancy to the very pinnacle of plutocratic power and the naked fawning of Silicon Valley’s finest — Bezos and Zuckerberg being at the forefront –at President Trump’s altar — are the clearest indication of big tech and Government working together, hand in glove. Super-powered by ever improving AI, those who control data, control the world. Marx’s dialectic focused on the control of the “means of production” by the bourgeois class, who in his theory would keep the proletarian classes in a permanent state of subjugation. Marx was fundamentally wrong about the nature of economic activity and the ability of capitalism to generate economic growth and innovation. However, there is an insight he had which is relevant to our time. He was acutely aware of how there is a tendency for capitalism, unrestrained, to lead to concentrations of power. Marx was focused on the material means of production — plant, machinery, agricultural activity. However, in this third decade of the 21st century we are now confronted with a very small number of technology companies who possess a much greater power than Marx had ever thought that the bourgeois class may possess — the power to determine what we think, how we think and when we think it. Effectively, the power to significantly influence the human mind, insidiously, stealthily but with unrelenting ferocity. Recall the angst that was caused decades ago by the apparent concentration of power that would result from the increasing control over global media by the likes of Rupert Murdoch. These concerns seem trivial when compared to the control Musk can exercise through his ownership of Twitter, Zuckerberg through the control of Meta and Bezos through Amazon, to use just three examples.

This control matters to Sub-Saharan Africa at the level of the individual because of the loss of thought autonomy through the ubiquity of these platforms and the power of suggestion, the feeding of pre-existing prejudices and biases and the targeting of messaging that they have unleashed. Conversely, the control of data has also empowered unfiltered speech and allowed the organisation of campaigns and movements online at speed, for example against authoritarian governments.

At the level of the state, data control matters for two principal reasons: the first is for the same reason as it matters to the individual. States remain in control by having a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence and by being able to drown out dissent. The ship has arguably sailed on this second limb except in hermetically sealed countries such as North Korea, for better and for worse. However, there remain attempts at internet shutdowns or degradations as well as the sponsorship of state-funded social media warriors and bots. The second reason it matters is because large corporations and other Governments can now more easily and with limited attribution undermine other Governments with whom they disagree, through the weaponisation of data.

The third danger is the extent to which our public sphere has been debased by the various platforms. Two data points suffice to make this point. Pornography sites receive more traffic than Netflix, Amazon and Twitter combined. 35% of all internet downloads are porn related. No more need be said about debasement except that the debasement does not stop there. Jonathan Haidt has written convincingly about the rise in suicide and in depression and other psychological ailments since 2012, especially in the youth — the year the smartphone began to become prevalent. The re-wiring of the human mind and the impact on the psychological well-being of homo sapiens by the centrality of the mobile phone to our lives is probably amongst the most under-estimated calamity to befall society. The Australian Government’s approach to banning access to social media to those under sixteen can legitimately be criticised for its incursion into parental choice and may be a step too far by a nanny state but it does represent the first serious acknowledgement of the issues at stake.

As African societies, how should we choose to deal with the consequences of these dangers? Will we make our own choices, or will we allow our choices to be framed and made by others, who have their own interests and agendas? There is little evidence that African Governments are alive to these issues and actively engaging them — there are hardly any sub-Saharan African countries that even have ministries or Government departments focused on the impact of Big Tech and AI.

For those of us in Sub-Saharan Africa, attempts are already underway to choose our “friends” and by implication our “enemies”. We have of course been here before, as Sub-Saharan Africa. This was largely the playbook of the post-colonial era and most of our nations navigated this period poorly and made unfortunate and unsophisticated choices.

President Trump’s recent executive order threatening sanctions against countries who seek a fair tax return from global multi-nationals operating in their markets is an undisguised alliance between the power of the US Government and Big Tech. It is a harbinger of the challenges that sub-Saharan African countries may need to navigate diplomatically but without capitulation.

To succeed in a multi-polar world will require an extremely nuanced approach to foreign policy by Sub-Saharan African countries. There are lessons to be drawn from South-East Asia. Singapore is an outstanding example of a nation able to dance on a pin in terms of balancing its foreign policy interests. Very much a friend to the USA, but of strategic relevance to China, India, and the entire ASEAN arena, it retains influence and relevance with little power. Beyond Singapore, there are critical insights to be drawn from Malaysia and Indonesia — two Southeast Asian nations that, despite their larger sizes and complex socio-political dynamics, have successfully navigated global power shifts. Malaysia, for instance, has adeptly balanced its relationships with both China and the West. While deeply engaged in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has maintained strong defence and economic ties with the U.S. and its allies. This ability to hedge between competing superpowers while extracting economic benefits is a model worth emulating. On the other hand, Indonesia, as the largest ASEAN member and a G20 economy, has championed regional leadership while maintaining policy independence. It has successfully navigated U.S.-China competition by emphasizing ASEAN multilateralism and refusing to align exclusively with either power. Indonesia’s resource nationalism offers a template for Africa’s commodity-rich nations. By restricting raw nickel exports and mandating in-country processing, Indonesia has compelled global investors to develop local industries rather than merely extracting raw materials — a strategy that nations in Sub-Saharan Africa have struggled to implement but whose implementation would create more positive economic outcomes.

The lesson for Sub-Saharan African countries is clear: strategic agility, rooted in self-interest but informed by global realities, is not optional — it is essential. These nations must build relationships across the spectrum of global powers while remaining clearsighted about their own priorities.

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa must leverage their unique position, resources, and markets to assert influence and secure partnerships that support long-term development goals. There have been fledgling examples of these kinds of strategies in Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa albeit without adequate execution and the pursuit of long-term domestic development objectives.

For example, in the east, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa sit astride the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a critical gateway for shipping lanes linking the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Along Africa’s western coast, countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire provide direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, with growing potential for trade between Africa, the Americas, and Europe. In the south, South Africa’s ports and infrastructure serve as a gateway between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, while in the centre, landlocked nations such as Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo hold vast natural resources that can fuel regional supply chains. Finally, the eastern corridor, anchored by Kenya and Tanzania, serves as a crucial bridge between the African continent and the Asian economies across the Indian Ocean.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s geographical diversity also means different regions can specialize in specific areas of economic activity. For example, East Africa, with its access to the Indian Ocean and its expanding tech ecosystems, can become a global outsourcing and innovation hub like the Straits of Malacca’s strategic value of linking the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as the most efficient route in global maritime trade. West Africa, rich in natural resources and a growing consumer market, can anchor supply chains for energy and agribusiness. Southern Africa can lead in renewable energy and mineral beneficiation, turning its resources into high-value products for global markets.

However, geography alone is not enough. Sub-Saharan Africa must replicate Singapore’s strategy of transforming its location into a value-adding gateway, rather than merely a transit point. Singapore achieved this by investing in world-class infrastructure, creating a transparent regulatory environment, and positioning itself as a neutral and trusted partner in global trade. Africa’s strategic locations must be supported by infrastructure that connects ports to inland markets, by special economic zones that attract investment, and by policies that make doing business seamless for international partners. There is indeed an example of an African country that has taken advantage of its geographical position in this way: Morocco. Its car industry, producing vehicles for the European and North American markets, is an example for others in Africa to emulate, in terms of creating value chains and supportive infrastructure as a catalyst for growth. Morocco’s success was not accidental — it was built on strategic industrial policies, infrastructure investments, and a well-coordinated public-private partnership model. For example, Morocco invested heavily in infrastructure — USD 15 billion between 2010 and 2015 — on high-speed rail, highways, and port development to improve logistics and trade efficiency. This has enabled Morocco to position itself as a competitive automotive hub, exporting vehicles and parts to Europe with cost advantages over Eastern European manufacturers.

The operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), for instance, presents an unprecedented opportunity to integrate Africa’s ports, railways, and highways into a cohesive network. Investments in regional infrastructure corridors — such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor or the North-South Corridor linking southern and central Africa — can transform isolated geographical advantages into interconnected hubs of trade and commerce. Similarly, Sub-Saharan African countries must focus on digitizing trade processes to reduce costs and delays, following Singapore’s lead in adopting smart port technologies and integrated logistics platforms.

From where is capital flowing?

“Middle powers” are increasingly relevant to capital flows. It is likely that many Indian and US companies will remain focused on their own domestic markets and core foreign markets. However, companies in the GCC have now built significant expertise and capital and could be valuable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) providers. China has the largest pool of industrial capacity in the world, capable of export and currently under-utilised as its growth rates have reduced. The BRICS nations are increasingly assertive.

Some of this capital is private, some of it driven by state controlled or state influenced companies, pursing state policy. The Chinese state corporations are the most obvious examples of this. This is not necessarily a bad thing but being aware of this and implementing procurement policies that are able to withstand influence and ensure that value for money is provided is essential if Sub-Saharan African states are to avoid white elephant projects, unsustainable debt burdens and capital investments.

What can Africa do to re-position and make itself more competitive?

However, considering all these changes in geo-politics and considering the impact of the fundamental economic changes driven by AI, machine learning and robotics, where will growth for Africa come from? Sub-Saharan economies are very diverse, and each country and region will inevitably attract investments suited to those economies. For example, some will attract more in hospitality, others in renewable energy and some in mining. However, there are some over-arching themes that will drive multi-year, sustained growth:

1. There is little doubt that China will outsource its manufacturing capability across the world, in part because of lower cost, in part to more easily access local markets and in part to address the likely impact of punitive US trade measures. To attract these investments, Sub-Saharan African countries will need to provide access to cheap, reliable, renewable energy and build special economic zones in which large scale manufacturers can effectively “plug and play”.

2. The continued operationalisation of the AfCFTA will enhance the likelihood of Chinese investments and investments in manufacturing from other countries such as India, Brazil and the GCC. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once a dominant force in Africa’s infrastructure development, appears to have receded in priority as China grapples with domestic economic challenges. Thus, a diversification of partnership with the these countries would enhance sub-Saharan Africa’s position. To navigate these partnerships effectively, African nations must strengthen procurement policies to avoid unsustainable debt and ensure that investments align with their development priorities.

3. Whilst most of the West is currently engaged in an intellectually incoherent debate about immigration; labour shortages in those markets — but also in other countries with high growth or ageing populations such as Japan — will sooner rather than later result in immigration policies designed to fill these labour shortages.

The nature and extent of these shortages will vary from one country to another but will include shortages of skilled health workers (nurses, nurse aids, community health workers, old age carers and laboratory technicians), skilled workers in the construction industry, teachers, those working in the hospitality industry. There is, therefore, a significant opportunity for Sub-Saharan African countries to provide skilled Africans to the world. This will solve the labour shortages in so many of the more developed countries, improve education in Africa and lead to massive remittance flows into Africa, which will in turn boost local economies further — see Figure 4 which reflects the value of remittance flows to the continent.

4. Just as there are opportunities to export skilled Africans to more developed markets, there is an equally large if not larger opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa to become an outsourcing destination, at scale. Again, just as in the case of manufacturing access to cheap, reliable, renewable energy and special economic zones will be essential. However, it would be naive to assume that skilled African labour will be welcomed without addressing the social tensions surrounding illegal immigration. Countries of origin must take a proactive role in managing migration by addressing push factors such as unemployment, governance deficits, and lack of opportunity. Structured agreements between African nations and Western countries could facilitate legal migration pathways, benefiting both sides. The African Union needs to step up here.

As the world is being re-ordered at speed, there will be winners and losers. Policy wins or policy missteps will have generational consequences. As observed by Vladmir Lenin at the onset of the Russian Revolution in 1917, “there are decades when nothing happens; and there are weeks when decades happen.” This is one of those times.

Conclusion

With the world undergoing rapid reordering, Sub-Saharan Africa finds itself at a crossroads. Its ability to capitalise on global trends — whether through leveraging its demographic dividend, expanding manufacturing, or addressing labour shortages globally — will determine its trajectory for generations to come. Africa cannot afford to be a passive bystander as global power shifts; it must act decisively, with strategic foresight and agility.

The lessons from nations like Singapore are clear: success lies in strategic positioning, rooted in self-interest but informed by global realities. Africa must not only build relationships across the spectrum of global powers but also take ownership of its narrative, resources, and policy choices. The time for mere potential has passed — what remains is the imperative to deliver. For Africa, this is a defining moment.

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Notes

1. Mordor Intelligence: “Morocco Automotive Market Analysis — Industry Growth, Size and Forecast Report (2025–2030)”, [Click for full link].
   
   
2. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology (1845–1846). In Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
   
   
3. Zak Doffman. “Porn Block: ‘Potentially Disastrous’ U.K. Age and ID Checks on All Sites from July 15.” Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/17/u-k-to-introduce-potentially-disastrous-age-and-id-checks-on-all-porn-sites/.
   
   
4. Thomas Hughes: “Allies or Enemies? Trump’s Threats against Canada and Greenland Put NATO in a Tough Spot.” The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/allies-or-enemies-trumps-threats-against-canada-and-greenland-put-nato-in-a-tough-spot-247194.
   
   
5. George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
   
   
6. Joseph Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents. New York, W.W. Norton, 2003.
   
   
7. Gladys Lopez-Acevedo and Kaleb Abreha: “The shifting landscape of global manufacturing: from offshoring to reshoring and its welfare implications”, https://shorturl.at/OE17b.
   
   
8. Justin Fox, Harvard Business Review: “What Alan Greenspan Has Learned Since 2008”, https://hbr.org/2014/01/what-alan-greenspan-has-learned-since-2008.
   
   
9. International Monetary Fund:| “Institutional Coverage and Ownership: Key Characteristics”, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781589065659/ch002.xml.
   
   
10. ISS African Futures: “Lower middle-income Africa”, https://futures.issafrica.org/geographic/income-groups/lower-middle-income-africa/.
    
    
11. Fukuyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (1992). New York: The Free Press.
    
    
12. World Bank: “Economic Diversification Efforts Paying Off in GCC Region but More Reforms Needed” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/11/22/economic-diversification-efforts-paying-off-in-gcc-region-but-more-reforms-needed.
    
    
13. BJP refers to the Bharatiya Janata Party and currently led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
    
    
14. Nokhil Inamdar: India’s economy: The good, bad and ugly in six charts, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68823827.
    
    
15. Business Sweden: The Rise of the South East Asian Tigers: Elements for Success in South East Asia, https://www.business-sweden.com/contentassets/c5d9f4d114f14219a3f0be9c3ac80145/the-rise-of-the-southeast-asian-tigers.pdf.

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